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Character, Choice and Criminal Responsibility 
George MOUSOURAKIS* 
This paper examines the issue of criminal responsibility and the role of 
legal excuses from two theoretical viewpoints : the character theory and the 
choice theory of responsibility. The character theory claims that the moral 
assessment of an offender's character is a necessary prerequisite of crimi-
nal liability and punishment. Legal excuses preclude the attribution of 
moral and legal blame because, by negating voluntariness, they block the 
inference from a wrongful act to a flawed character. The choice theory, on 
the other hand, claims that criminal responsibility pertains to the voluntary 
violation of the law rather than to the doing of an immoral act as such. For 
the choice theorist criminal responsibility is concerned with choices rather 
than with character traits. From this point of view, excuses are taken to 
preclude criminal liability because, when these conditions are present, the 
actor does not have sufficient capacity or a fair opportunity to choose to 
act according to law. The paper concludes that the character theory, by 
placing the emphasis on those character traits that motivate a person's 
choices offers a better basis for understanding the moral significance of 
human actions and for explaining and jusiifying the attribution of criminal 
responsibility and punishment. 
Le présent article examine la responsabilité criminelle et le rôle des 
excuses selon deux points de vue théoriques différents: la théorie fondée 
sur le caractère de l'accusé («the character theory») et la théorie de la 
responsabilité fondée sur le choix («the choice theory»). La première 
préconise l'individualisation de l'examen de la culpabilité morale et de la 
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punition de manière à tenir compte des traits de caractère de l'accusé. Les 
excuses empêchent d'imputer tout blâme à l'auteur d'un acte interdit 
commis involontairement ; elles repoussent ainsi Vinference entre la nature 
mauvaise de l'acte et les traits de caractère répréhensibles de l'accusé. La 
deuxième théorie revendique que la responsabilité criminelle se rattache au 
caractère volontaire de la contravention à la loi plutôt qu'à la nature 
immorale de la conduite. Dans ce cadre, la responsabilité criminelle con-
cerne davantage les choix que les traits de caractère. De ce point de vue, 
les excuses empêchent l'attribution de la responsabilité criminelle parce 
que l'auteur de l'acte n'a pas, dans les circonstances donnant ouverture à 
une excuse, une capacité suffisante ou une opportunité équitable de choisir 
de respecter la loi. L'auteur conclut que la théorie fondée sur le caractère 
de l'accusé, en mettant l'accent sur les traits de la personnalité qui mo-
tivent les choix d'une personne, offre un meilleur fondement théorique pour 
comprendre les actions humaines sous l'angle moral et pour expliquer et 
justifier l'attribution de la responsabilité criminelle et de la sanction. 
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Criminal law doctrine proceeds from the principle that a person cannot 
be found guilty of an offence unless two basic elements are established : the 
conduct or state of affairs which a particular offence prohibits (actus reus) 
and the state of mind which a person must have at the time of such conduct 
or state of affairs (mens rea). Criminal liability and punishmentdepend, 
moreover, upon the absence of certain justifying or excusing conditions. An 
act which meets the external requirements of a criminal offence is deemed 
nonetheless not unlawful if it falls under a norm of justification. Justifica-
tions complement or modify the primary or prohibitory norms of the crimi-
nal law by allowing for exceptions in prescribed circumstances. Excuses, by 
contrast, do not dispute the wrongfulness and unlawfulness of the act as 
such, but call in question the attribution of an unlawful act to the actor. 
Writers in criminal law distinguish between excusing conditions negating a 
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mental state as a prescribed element of an offence definition, and excusing 
conditions denying or diminishing moral blame as a necessary prerequisite 
of criminal liability, despite the presence of the requisite state of mind. 
Cases where breaking the law results from the extraordinary psychological 
pressure to which the actor was subjected are treated under the latter 
category of excuses. In such cases the wrongful and unlawful act may be 
committed with both knowledge of its unlawful character and intention, i.e. 
with mens rea, but culpability is precluded or diminished on the assumption 
that, in the overwhelming circumstances the actor found herself in, she 
could not have acted otherwise. In these cases the actor is said to act 
morally involuntarily. The defence of duress provides the typical example 
here. On the other hand, conditions falling under the former category of 
excuses are understood to negate the necessary volitional or cognitive 
elements required by offence definitions. In such cases the actor is either 
unable to exercise control over her bodily movements, i.e. she acts involun-
tarily, or is unaware of or mistaken about some material fact relating to the 
nature of her conduct. The defences of automatism and mistake of fact 
belong to this group of excuses1. 
The question of excusing in law has been the subject of different 
philosophical theories of responsibility. These theories attempt to shed light 
on the nature and function of legal excuses and to justify their role in a 
criminal justice system. This paper examines the issue of excusing in law 
from two different theoretical standpoints : the character theory and the 
choice theory of responsibility. The two theories differ on the kinds of 
causes of action they each find to provide the basis for holding people 
responsible. The character theory, focuses on character, the choice theory 
on choice and the capacity to choose. It is argued that the character theory 
of responsibility, by drawing attention to what lies behind and motivates 
actual choices, offers a better basis for interpreting the moral significance of 
human actions and for explaining our actual blaming judgements with 
regard to those actions. 
1. Criminal Responsibility and Moral Character 
Writers in criminal law often emphasise the important relationship 
between criminal law and what is described as social or common morality. 
The main difference, it is pointed out, between criminal law and other 
branches of the law is that criminal law seeks to punish conduct which 
1. For a discussion of the legal use of the term « voluntariness » see A.R. WHITE, Grounds 
of Liability, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1985, p. 57 ff. 
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threatens the system of values upon which society is based2. Criminal 
sanction expresses society's disapproval of a wrongful act not in the ab-
stract but as reflecting the actor's moral stance with regard to commonly 
shared values and expectations and, as such, it constitutes the strongest 
formal condemnation that society can inflict on wrongdoers. It is the ele-
ment of moral stigma that marks out the social significance of criminal 
liability and punishment and it is precisely this element that requires a clear 
moral justification3. 
The principal claim of the character theory is that when a person is 
convicted of a crime, society expresses a negative judgement on that per-
son's moral worth. This means that only when the wrongful act reveals a 
flaw in the actor's character the imposition of criminal punishment may be 
morally justified4. The assumption here is that moral and legal responsibility 
is primarily concerned with those enduring and interrelated features which 
make up what we call a person's character, her emotions, values, desires, 
aversions, ambitions etc. These attributes of character as well as the way 
they manifest themselves in conduct are the result of a person's prior 
experience, moral education and critical self-reflection. Actions, the object 
of praise or blame, are seen as expressions of particular character traits in 
their authors5. But judgements of blame or praise ultimately pertain not to 
actions as such but to the character traits or attitudes that bring them about. 
Such an approach to moral and legal responsibility presupposes that per-
2. For an elaborate defence of this view of the criminal law see P. DEVLIN, The Enforcement 
of Morals, London, Oxford University Press, 1965. Devlin argues that there is a common 
or shared morality which ensures the cohesion of society. Any deviation from this 
common morality poses a threat to society by undermining its cohesion. For this reason, 
he argues, it may be justifiable and necessary to penalise immoral behaviour. 
3. See J. FEINBERG, «The Expressive Function of Punishment », in H. GROSS and A. VON 
HIRSCH (eds), Sentencing, New York and Oxford, 1981, pp. 23-36. 
4. As N. Lacey remarks « it is unfair to hold people responsible for actions which are out 
of character...[and] fair to hold them so for actions in which their settled dispositions 
are centrally expressed » : N. LACEY, State Punishment, London, Routledge, 1988, p. 68. 
5. The character theory of responsibility is often associated with the Scottish philosopher 
David Hume and his doctrine of the moral sense. According to this doctrine, a form of 
intuitionism prevalent in eighteenth century British philosophy, the perception of certain 
actions or gives rise to special feelings of pleasure or pain in the observer. These feelings 
enable her to distinguish right from wrong actions and, at the same time, provide 
motivesto moral conduct. But the object of the moral sense is not so much actions assuch 
but the character reflected in them. As Hume remarked « actions are objects of our moral 
sentiment, so far only as they are indications of the internal character» : D. HUME, An 
Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, La Salle, Open Court, 1949, p. 108. And see 
his Treatise of Human Nature ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1888, 
pp 477 575 For an account of Hume's theory see M BAYLES «Hume on Blame and 
Excuse» (1976) 1 Hume Studies 2 17-35 
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sons are in some way responsible for their characters6. It is assumed that 
persons are capable of being aware of and exercising a degree of control 
over those character traits and dispositions that motivate their rational 
choices in acting. It is precisely this assumption that makes the attribution 
of moral and legal responsibility possible. As Arenella points out 
A character—based conception of moral agency could be used to explain why 
moral agents possess the capacity to think, feel, interpret and behave like a 
reasonable person [...] [T]his character model would locate [a person's] moral 
culpability in his earlier failure to do something about a character defect that clearly 
could impair his ability to make the right moral choice in certain circumstances. We 
blame him for not acting like a reasonable person because we believe he is morally 
responsible for not doing something about those defective aspects of his character 
that prevent him from acting like one7. 
As this suggests, the ultimate basis for holding people culpable lies in 
their failure to do something about those character traits or attitudes that 
prompt them to engage in morally and legally objectionable conduct. 
From the point of view of the character theory, the various states of 
mind, such as intention, recklessness or negligence, which the law requires 
to be proved before an accused is convicted of an offence, are seen as 
indicating differing attitudes towards societal values or interests. Although 
attitudes may be short-lived or changing the law relies upon a general 
hypothesis that certain conduct accompanied by the requisite state of mind 
manifests a socially undesirable character trait or attitude. Thus, a person 
who commits an offence intentionally, is taken to manifest a clear desire to 
cause the prescribed harm and, consequently, a strong attitude towards the 
occurrence of that harm. A person who brings about the prohibited state of 
affairs recklessly, i.e. with the knowledge that her conduct involves a 
substantial risk that such state of affairs may occur, displays a less undesira-
ble disposition toward the prescribed harm. She does not desire the harm to 
occur, but is indifferent at to whether it occurs or not. Depending on the 
degree to which the relevant harm is likely to eventuate, the person may be 
6. Aristotle believed that we are responsible for our characters because we are capable of 
choosing to be the persons we are. (Nichomachean Ethics, III, Illlb31-1112al7). Ac-
cording to a weaker version of this approach.although initially we have no control over 
the processes through which our characters are formed, we later on develop an ability 
to maintain or shape our characters through our choices. For a fuller account of this 
view as it relates to criminal responsibility see E.L. PINCOFFS, « Legal Responsibility 
and Moral Character», (1973) 19 Wayne Law Review 905-923. 
7. P. ARENELLA, « Character, Choice and Moral Agency : The Relevance of Character to 
Our Moral Culpability Judgments », (1990) 7 Social Philosophy and Policy 59, reprinted 
in Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law, M.L. CORRADO (ed), (New York, 
London : Garland Publishing, 1994), 241, at p. 257. 
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said to manifest a more or less undesirable attitude. And the more undesira-
ble the attitude the more blame and, consequently, punishment the person 
deserves. 
According to character theory, criminal liability and punishment turns 
on two interrelated requirements, namely just deserts and voluntariness. 
The requirement of just deserts relates to the assumption that the distinctive 
feature of criminal punishment is that it expresses moral blame. And, as was 
explained above, moral blame involves something more than the formal 
disapproval of the wrongful act : it involves also the moral disapproval of 
the wrongdoer's character as manifested by her commission of an offence. 
In the words of Professor Fletcher, one of the chief contemporary advo-
cates of this approach to criminal responsibility, 
An inference from the wrongful act to the actor's character is essential to a 
retributive theory of punishment. A fuller statement of the argument would go like 
this : (1) punishing wrongful conduct is just only if punishment is measured by the 
desert of the offender, (2) the desert of an offender is gauged by his character— i.e., 
the kind of person he is, (3) and therefore, a judgment about character is essential 
to the just distribution of punishment8. 
According to Fletcher, we blame a person who committed a wrongful 
act only if the act reveals what sort of person the actor is, that is, only if we 
can infer from the commission of a wrongful act that the actor's character 
is flawed9. From this point of view the chief aim of criminal punishment is 
retribution : inflicting pain on offenders who are morally blameworth10. 
Some retributivists offer purely deontological justifications for requiring a 
connection between just deserts and punishment. By adopting Kant's cate-
gorical imperative that a moral agent must be treated as an end in herself, 
not as a means to an end, they argue that it is « right » to give people what 
they deserve, irrespective of the desirable or not consequences for society 
8. G. FLETCHER, Rethinking Criminal Law, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1978, p. 800. 
9. A similar approach is adopted by J. FEINBERG, Doing and Deserving, Princeton, Prince-
ton University Press, 1970, p. 126. See also J. GLOVER, Responsibility, Princeton, Prince-
ton University Press, 1974; M. BAYLES, «Character, Purpose and Criminal Responsi-
bility», (1982) 1 Law and Philosophy 5-20. 
10. For a discussion of contemporary approaches to retributive punishment and the notion 
of just deserts see T. HONDERICH, Punishment, The Supposed Justifications, Har-
mondsworth, 1984, Postscript ; and see C.L. TEN, Crime, Guilt and Puniihment, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1987, p. 38 ff. ; H.A. BEDAU, « Retribution and the Theory of Punish-
ment», (1978) 75 The Journal of Philosophy 601-620; J. COTTINGHAM, «Varieties of 
Retribution», (1979) 29 The Philosophical Quarterly 238-246 ; J. FINNIS, «The Restora-
tion of Retribution», (1971-72) 32 Analysis 131-135; D.J. GALLIGAN, «The Return to 
Retribution in Penal Theory », in C TAPPER (ed,, Crime, Proof and Punishment, London, 
1981, pp. 144-171. 
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that such a practice may entail, because this is what justice demands11. 
Others have adopted a comparative notion of desert, which links punish-
ment with justice in the distribution of benefits and burdens in society12. But 
if, according to the character theory, it is character traits rather than acts 
that is the focus of just deserts, what is wrong with punishing people directly 
for bad character ? As Fletcher explains 
[T]he limitation of the inquiry to a single wrongful act follows not from the theory 
of desert, but from the principle of legality. We accept the artificiality of inferring 
character from a single deed as the price of maintaining the suspect's privacy. [...] 
Disciplining the inquiry in this way [...] secures the individual against a free-ranging 
enquiry of the state into his moral worth13. 
The character theory of criminal responsibility views just deserts as 
dependent upon the requirement of voluntariness. In this context the notion 
of voluntariness is understood as being wide enough to encompass all cases 
in which a person is said to be in control of and therefore morally responsi-
ble for her actions. The concept of voluntariness may be interpreted to 
denote either the actor's ability to control her external conduct—i.e. to act 
in a strict sense—or the actor's capacity to determine freely the course of 
her action—i.e. to give effect to her choice of action. In the former sense 
voluntariness refers to intentional action as a necessary prerequisite for 
ascribing what may be described as authorship — responsibility; in the 
latter sense voluntariness pertains to action which is both intentional and 
free as required for the attribution of moral responsibility. It is moral 
responsibility as presupposing authorship—responsibility that the notion 
of voluntariness should be understood as referring to here. 
Why criminal responsibility, as involving just deserts, hinges on the 
requirement of voluntariness ? Simply because only voluntary action can 
warrant the inference from a wrongful act that the actor's character is 
flawed. The requirement of voluntariness indicates that a person cannot be 
convicted and punished of an offence unless she was capable of exercising 
control over her conduct. In this respect excusing conditions, by negating 
voluntariness, are seen as blocking the normal inference from a wrongful act 
to a flawed or defective character and hence as blocking the attribution of 
11. See e.g. J. KLEINING, Punishment and Desert, The Hague, 1973, p. 67. See also 
L.H. DAVIES, «They Deserve to Suffer», (1971-72) 32 Analysis 136-140. 
12. See e.g. H. MORRIS, « Persons and Punishment », in J.G. MURPHY (ed), Punishment and 
Rehabilitation, Belmont, 1973 ; D.J. GALLIGAN, op. cit., note 10, especially pp. 154-157. 
13. G. FLETCHER, op. cit., note 8, pp. 800-801. And as Dworkin notes « The government may 
restrain a man for his own or the general good, but it may do so only on the basis of his 
behaviour, and it must strive to judge his behaviour from the same standpoint as he 
judges himself, that is, from the standpoint of his intentions, motives, and capacities » : 
R. DWORKIN, Taking Rights Seriously, London, Duckworth, 1977, at 11. 
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moral blame as a necessary prerequisite of criminal responsibility. Excuses, 
in other words, negate moral and legal responsibility for prima facie wrong-
ful actions which are not expressive of undesirable character traits. For 
example, a accused who, acting under a reasonable mistake of fact, brought 
about a prohibited harm cannot be said to have manifested, through her 
action, an undesirable character trait and therefore she cannot be held 
morally and legally responsible for the harm caused14. If, however, the 
accused's mistake was unreasonable, she may be found guilty of a negli-
gence-based offence. In such a case, the accused's failure to realise that her 
conduct involved a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm in a situation 
where she should have realised it can be said to indicate an undesirable 
character trait and therefore a degree of blame is appropriate. Here the 
accused's failure to conform to a prescribed standard of care reflects an 
socially undesirable attitude, namely indifference to the welfare of others. 
Similarly, a person who commits an offence intentionally, but only because 
she is compelled to do so by threats or other forms of coercion which she 
cannot reasonably be expected to avoid or resist, does not display a defect 
of character as required for the attribution of moral and legal responsibility 
(such a person is said to act morally involuntarily). However, if the person 
is found to have caused through her own fault the conditions of coercion 
or lack of self-control under which the offence was committed her excuse 
may reduce but will not negate culpability for the offence In such a case 
the person's causing or failing to prevent the incapacitating condition is seen 
as reflecting an defect in that person's character 
The character theory of criminal responsibility also provides a basis for 
understanding the role of partial excuses in the criminal law. A person who 
kills another under provocation, for example, does not deserve to be 
branded as a murderer, for the fact that she had lost her normal self-control 
capacities, as any reasonable person would when faced with die same 
provocation, precludes the normal inference from the act of killing of such 
a grave character flaw as required for a conviction of murder. Nevertheless, 
the accused is still culpable to a lesser degree for allowing her justifiable 
anger at the provoker to fester to the point that it unduly interfered with her 
capacity to exercise self-control. The accused's criminal liability for the 
lesser offence of manslaughter, in such cases, is based on a character 
—based moral judgement about her culpability for allowing herself to be 
carried away by passion and kill. 
14. As Fletcher remarks, « mistaken beliefs are relevant to what the actor is trying to do if 
they affect his incentive in acting. They affect his incentive if knowing of the mistake 
would give him a good reason for changing his course of conduct » : G. FLETCHER, op. 
cit., note 8, p. 161. 
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The character theory of criminal responsibility has been criticised on 
the grounds that it builds upon an incomplete view of the criminal law15. 
Modern criminal law, it is argued, is not concerned only with what is seen 
as immoral conduct expressive of bad character. There is an increasing 
number of criminal offences in which the element of moral stigma is absent 
or hardly distinguishable. With regard to these offences criminal liability is 
imposed merely as a practical means of regulating or controlling certain 
forms of social activity. The moral blame, which normally accompanies the 
more serious crimes (the so called mala in se) is almost absent in what is 
referred to as «regulatory» offences (otherwise known as mala prohi-
bita)16. As far as the latter offences are concerned moral blame—the infe-
rence from a wrongful act to a flawed character—cannot provide the test 
for criminal liability. These offences therefore fall outside the scope of the 
present theory of criminal responsibility. 
Another problem which the theory faces, according to some critics, is 
that the bounds of what is referred to as common or social morality, in the 
light of which conduct is assessed as immoral and hence as possibly illegal, 
is sometimes very difficult to circumscribe. Devlin argues that common 
morality can be defined and measured according to the strength of the 
feelings of ordinary people. So, if certain conduct gives rise to feelings of 
intolerance or indignation among ordinary members of society, this would 
be a sufficient indication that the conduct in question threatens common 
morality—and as such it may be criminalized. Devlin proposes that com-
mon morality could be discovered by assembling a group of ordinary citi-
zens—in the form of a jury—and asking them to consider how certain 
forms of conduct should be classified17. But, as Devlin's critics remark, the 
feelings of ordinary people may not be moral in nature but, rather, an 
expression of prejudice. Devlin's proposed method of discovering common 
15. For a fuller account of the criticisms against the character theory see e.g. H. GROSS, A 
Theory ofCriminalJustice, New York, Oxford University Press, 1979, especially pp. 340, 
386 ; M. MOORE, « Choice, Character and Excuse », (1990) 7 Social Philosophy and Policy 
59, reprinted in M.L. CORRADO (ed), Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law, (New 
York and London : Garland Publishing, 1994), 197 ; A. BRUDNER, « A Theory of Neces-
sity», (1987) 7 OJLS 339, 344-352; And see J. HORDER'S reply in Provocation and 
Responsibility, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, pp. 131-134. 
16. Merely regulatory offences are considered, for example, the illegal parking of a motor 
vehicle, or the riding of a bicycle without lights. In common law jurisdictions the large 
majority of these offences fall in the categories of strict and absolute liability offences, 
i.e. offences requiring a minimal only degree of fault or even no fault at all on the person's 
part. 
17. P. DEVLIN, The Enforcement of Morals, London, Oxford University Press, 1965, 
pp. 22-23. 
60 Les Cahiers de Droit (1998) 39 C. de D. .5 
morality—resorting to a jury made up of ordinary members of the commu-
nity —besides the fact that it does not preclude prejudice, it may also fail to 
lead to agreement on a number of morally disputed issues in society such as, 
for example, abortion or euthanasia18. With regard to criminal offences 
based on conduct whose moral basis remains in question it seems difficult 
to say that criminal liability is imposed only because the relevant conduct 
reflects a flaw in the actor's character or because we disapprove of the actor 
as an unworthy person. Indeed, the opposite may be the case if most 
members of society agree that certain conduct should no longer be consi-
dered immoral and must therefore be decriminalised. On the other hand, 
even where there is agreement as to the immorality of certain conduct, one 
cannot infer from a single instance of such conduct that the actor's charac-
ter is flawed. Legal blame is sometimes imposed on persons with good 
characters who, at a moment of weakness, have made a conscious but 
uncharacteristic choice to break the law. Although the commission of a 
criminal offence may be « out of character » for the offender, this does not 
preclude criminal liability and punishment from being imposed. And, con-
versely, even though an act may be expressive of a bad character, this does 
not necessary entail that such an act is or ought to be criminalized. 
The general plausibility of the character theory of criminal responsibi-
lity cannot be denied on these grounds, however. It may be true that legal 
punishment, as a particular type of social response, is not always imposed 
for morally blameworthy conduct. But criminalization rests upon the appli-
cation of the harm principle. According to that principle, only conduct that 
causes or is likely to cause societal harm should be criminalized19. It is on 
the basis of the harm principle that certain forms of conduct are prescribed 
as criminal offences. But the character theory is not concerned with the 
issue of criminalization (or decriminalization) as such. Rather, it is the quite 
separate question of whether a person who has caused one of the prescribed 
harms should be characterised as a criminal that the character theory 
focuses on. Its primary aim is to provide a basis for dealing with the question 
of culpability in the application of the criminal law in a way that accords 
with our common conceptions of justice and fairness. In dealing with this 
question, the character theory relies on the assumption that every harmful 
action is expressive of an undesirable character trait, irrespective of 
18. For an evaluation of Devlin's views see e.g. : WILLIAMS «Authoritarian Morals and 
Criminal Law », [1966] Crim.L.R. 132 ; R. DWORKIN, « Lord Devlin and the Enforcement 
of Morals», (1966) 75 Yale L.J. 986; G.B. HUGHES, «Morals and the Criminal Law», 
(1962) 71 Yale L.J. 662. See also R.E. SARTORIUS, «The Enforcement of Morality», 
(1972)81 Yale L.J. 891. 
19. For a fuller discussion of the harm principle see J. RAZ, The Morality of Freedom, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986, especially Ch. 15. 
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whether such action is « in » or « out » of character for the offender20. Thus, 
if a person of previously impeccable character suddenly and unexpectedly 
gives in to an impulse to steal someone else's umbrella, his generally good 
character will be irrelevant as far as that person's criminal liability for 
stealing is concerned21. As the character theory is concerned with bad 
character only to the extent that it is reflected in harmful actions, it is a 
mistake to think that, from this point of view, criminal punishment is 
imposed for bad character as such22. No matter our differences as to what 
constitutes immoral and therefore socially undesirable behaviour, as re-
gards the majority of criminal offences, moral blameworthiness remains a 
necessary (although not sufficient) condition for justifiable punishment. 
With regard to these offences, therefore, the character based theory is 
both plausible and compatible with current criminal law doctrine. 
2. Choice, Fairness and Criminal Responsibility : H.L.A. Hart's Theory 
In his writings on criminal jurisprudence Professor Hart has elaborated 
a theory of criminal responsibility that has received wide recognition in 
common law jurisdictions23. (Hart's theory is sometimes referred to as the 
« choice » or « fairness » theory of criminal responsibility.) The starting-
point of Hart's theory is the position that the general justifying aim of the 
institution of punishment is the utilitarian one of general deterrence—the 
20. As Joel Feinberg explains, « When we say that a man is at fault, we usually mean only 
to refer to occurrent defects of acts or omissions, and only derivatively to the actor's 
flaw as the doer of the defective deed. Such judgments are at best presumptive evidence 
about the man's general character. An act can be faulty even when not characteristic of 
the actor, and the actor may be properly « to blame » for it anyway ; for if the action is 
faulty and it is also his action (characteristic or not), then he must answer for it. The 
faultiness of an action always reflects some discredit upon its doer, providing the doing 
is voluntary ». « Sua Culpa » in J. FEINBERG, op. cit., note 9, p. 192. 
21. Nevertheless, depending on the seriousness of the offence committed, previously good 
character is usually considered as a factor in mitigation of the sentence imposed for the 
offence. 
22. As Horder points out, « the character conception of culpability is parasitic on (a version 
of) the harm principle. It is therefore also focused on actions, the harmful actions 
proscribed under the harm principle. This naturally and properly limits the aspects of 
character that will be relevant to culpability » : J. HORDER, op. cit., note 15, p. 133. 
23. Hart's theory of criminal responsibility and punishment is contained in a series of essays 
published together under the title Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Phi-
losophy of Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1968 (reprinted with revisions in 1970, 1973, 
1978, 1982,1984). And see R. WASSERSTROM, «H.L.A. Hart and the Doctrines of Mens 
Rea and Criminal Responsibility », (1967) 35 Univ. Chic. L. Rev. 92-126. 
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prevention of socially harmful conduct. This should be distinguished, how-
ever, from the principles of justice applying to the distribution of punish-
ment24. Justice in the distribution of punishment requires that the applica-
tion of punishment should be restricted to those who could have avoided 
breaking the law25. Although Hart rejects retribution as the general aim of 
punishment, he considers it to be relevant to the distribution of punishment 
(hence he often speaks of «retribution in the distribution» of punish-
ment)26. 
According to Hart the principles applying to the distribution of punish-
ment represent values that are, to some extent, independent of general 
deterrence as the justifying aim of the institution of punishment. The chief 
function of these principles is to ensure that justice or fairness to the 
individual citizen is not sacrificed in the pursuit of utilitarian aims—such 
as general deterrence. And it is against justice to use individuals as a mere 
means for achieving certain social aims, no matter how important the latter 
may be, unless they have the capacity and fair opportunity to comply with 
the law27. From Hart's point of view, just punishment presupposes striking 
a balance between the pursuit of general deterrence and the need to protect 
the individual from being used as a means to achieving general social goals28. 
He recognises, however, that in certain exceptional cases the principle of 
fairness to the individual may be overridden by the need to promote or 
safeguard an important societal interest. He points out, nonetheless, that 
when we think it right to set aside the constraints laid down by the require-
ment of fairness to the individual «we should do so with the sense of 
sacrificing an important principle. We should be conscious of choosing the 
24. Hart distinguishes between the following tree questions : a) What is the justification of 
the institution of punishment ? b) Who may be subjected to criminal punishment ? c) How 
severe the punishment of an offender should be ? Only the first of these questions has 
to do with the general justifying aim of punishment—according to Hart, this is general 
deterrence, or the prevention of socially harmful conduct. The second and third questions 
pertain to the distribution of punishment. 
25. A similar position is reflected in Kant's famous dictum «ought implies can», although, 
unlike Hart, Kant places the emphasis on retribution rather than deterrence as the general 
justification of punishment. 
26. For a discussion of Hart's theory of punishment see J. FINNIS, « Old and New in Hart's 
Philosophy of Punishment», (1968) 8 Oxford Review 73-80. 
27. H.L.A. HART, op. cit., note 23, pp. 22-23, 181-183, 201. A similar position is adopted by 
H. GROSS, A Theory of Criminal Justice, New York, 1979, p. 137. 
28. It is precisely the application of these principles of justice, especially the one requiring 
that only those who brake the law voluntarily should be punished, that distinguishes 
punishment from other measures, e.g. the compulsory isolation of people infected with 
certain contagious diseases, in which these principles do not apply. 
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lesser of two evils, and this would be inexplicable if the principle sacrificed 
to utility were itself only a requirement of utility29 ». 
Hart views criminal responsibility as being dependent upon two inter-
related requirements, namely fairness to the individual and voluntariness. 
Basis of his understanding of fairness to the individual is a conception of 
society as a form of voluntary co-operation for mutual advantage among 
free and equal individuals. All members of such a society have a right to 
mutual forbearance from certain kinds of harmful behaviour. Society war-
rants that right by offering individuals 
the protection of the laws on terms which are fair, because they not only consist of 
a framework of reciprocal rights and duties, but because within this framework 
each individual is given a fair opportunity to choose between keeping the law 
required for society's protection or paying the penalty. From this point of view the 
actual punishment of a criminal appears not merely as something useful to society 
(General Aim) but as justly extracted from the criminal who has voluntarily done 
harm ; from the second it appears as a price justly extracted because the criminal 
had a fair opportunity beforehand to avoid liability to pay30. 
Within such a framework, Hart maintains, individual freedom is gua-
ranteed and the citizen's life protected from excessive interference on the 
part of state officials, for punishment may be imposed only for failures to 
comply with the fair demands of society. And only failures to conform to 
the demands of the law that are the outcome of a free choice warrant 
society's interference into a person's life. As Hart puts it, society needs a 
« moral licence » to punish, and this presupposes that those charged with 
offences have had the capacity and fair opportunity to comply with the law. 
As Hart's points out 
One necessary condition of the just application of a punishment is normally 
expressed by saying that the agent « could have helped » doing what he did, and 
hence the need to inquire into the «inner facts» is dictated not by the moral 
principle that only the doing of an immoral act may be legally punished, but by the 
moral principle that no one should be punished who could not help doing what he 
did. This is a necessary condition [...] for the moral propriety of legal punishment 
and no doubt also for moral censure ; in this respect law and morals are similar. But 
this similarity as to the one essential condition that there must be a « voluntary » 
action if legal punishment or moral censure is to be morally permissible does not 
mean that legal punishment is morally permissible only where the agent has done 
something morally wrong31. 
As this suggests, the moral principles of justice that apply to the 
distribution of punishment are independent of the moral or not character of 
29. H.L.A. HART, op. cit., note 23, p. 12. 
30. Id,, pp. 22-23. 
31. Id,, pp. 39-40; see also H.L.A. HART, The Concept of Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1961, p. 173. 
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the unlawful act at stake or the morality or immorality of the particular legal 
provision under which punishment is imposed32. If a morally evil law is 
applied even to those who have not broken it voluntarily, this is seen as an 
added wrong inflicted by the law. 
According to Hart, it is the moral principle of fairness to the individual 
that necessitates making criminal liability and punishment conditional on 
voluntariness33. The chief claim of the choice theory is that an accused is 
excused for committing an offence because at the time she did so she did not 
have the capacity or opportunity to choose to do otherwise. Moreover, 
where, under the circumstances, the exercise of choice is made very diffi-
cult, even though not impossible, a person may rely on a mitigating excuse, 
i.e. an excuse that will only reduce, although not totally negate, culpability. 
But this is as far as the inquiry goes. Under the choice theory, one does not 
need to go beyond the issue of choice and into the question of whether one's 
choices manifest a fault in the actor's character. The argument in support of 
the present theory is that while a choice always evidences the possession of 
a will, it is not necessarily representative of the actor's character as a whole. 
Thus, a wrongful act may render the actor morally and legally responsible, 
if it is the result of a free choice, even though it may be « out of character », 
i.e. not expressive of the actor's general state of character. 
Under the choice theory, a person can rely on an excuse where her 
conduct has not been caused, wholly or partly, by her choice but by factors 
over which she has had no control34. As Hart explains 
What is crucial is that those whom we punish should have had, when they acted, 
the normal capacities, physical and mental, for abstaining from what it [the law] 
forbids, and a fair opportunity to exercise these capacities. Where these capacities 
and opportunities are absent, as they are in different ways in the varied cases of 
accident, mistake, paralysis, reflex action, coercion, insanity, etc,, the moral protest 
32. Ibid. ; H. MORRIS, op. cit., note 12, pp. 40-64. 
33. For, as Hart explains, « even if things go wrong, as they do when mistakes are made or 
accidents occur, a man whose choices are right and who has done his best to keep the 
law will not suffer» : H.L.A. HART, op. cit., note 31, p. 182. Note, however, that here 
« right choice » means choosing to act in accordance with the law. 
34. A similar approach was adopted by William Blackstone in his Commentaries on the 
Laws of England ( 1769). Blackstone remarked that « [A]ll the several pleas and excuses, 
which protect the committer of a forbidden act from the punishment which is otherwise 
annexed thereto, may be reduced to this single consideration, the want or defect of will. 
An involuntary act, as it has no claim to merit, so neither can it induce any guilt : the 
concurrence of the will, when it has its choice either to do or to avoid the fact in ques-
tion, being the only thing that renders human actions either praiseworthy or culpable » 
(pp. 20-21). 
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is that it is morally wrong to punish because « he could not have helped it », or « he 
could not have done otherwise » or « he had no real choice »35. 
Consider the defence of necessity, for example. Necessity, as currently 
defined in England and other common law jurisdictions, pertains to situa-
tions in which a person commits an offence in order to avoid an imminent 
threat of death or serious bodily harm36. Unlike duress, where the danger to 
one's life comes from another human being, in cases of necessity the danger 
arises from the circumstances in which the person or persons are placed. 
When the defence of necessity is raised the jury are required to consider the 
following questions : (a) Was the accused compelled to act as she did 
because she had a good reason to fear (in view of the circumstances as she 
believed them to be) that otherwise death or serious injury would result ? (b) 
If so, would a reasonable person of ordinary firmness, sharing the charac-
teristics of the accused, have responded to the situation as the accused did ? 
As stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Perka v. R., necessity should 
be recognised as an excuses, and this implies no vindication of the accused's 
conduct37. An accused who successfully pleads necessity is legally (and 
morally) excused for committing a criminal offence Under the choice 
theory of responsibility the accused's claim in such a case may be inter-
preted in two interrelated ways The first interpretation is that faced with 
a imminent threat to her life or limb the accused was so overwhelmed bv 
fear that it was impossible for her to have acted in a different non-unlawful 
wav The emphasis in this reading of the excuse is on the' psychological 
pressure the accused found herself under in the circumstances The second 
interpretation of the excuse places the emphasis on how unfair the threat on 
her life or limb made the accused's situation of choice as compared to that 
of other ordinary people normally placed The first interpretation focuses 
on the person's defective capacity ; the second on her diminished onnortu-
nity to comply with the law But as'was noted earlier the defence would fail 
if it is established that the accused through her own fault acting 
negligently brought about the c r r m'st of neeess'tv f li did not 
respond as a reasonable person would have responded in the situation. 
Choice theorists have had some difficulties in dealing with the question 
of how responsibility for negligent action is to be accounted for under the 
choice theory. The problem is that the negligent actor cannot be said to have 
chosen to do the prohibited act, as the choice theory presupposes. Hart's 
answer to this problem is that the negligent actor is morally and legally 
35. H.L.A. HART, op. cit., note 23, p. 152. 
36. See e.g. Howe, [1987] AC 417 ; R. v. Conway, [1988] 3 AU ER 1025 ; R. v. Martin, [1989] 
1 All ER 652. 
37. Perka v. /?., (1985) 14 CCC (3d) 385, 13 DLR (4th) 1. 
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responsible not for choosing to do a wrongful act, but for not exercising her 
capacity to choose not to do it, when she had a fair opportunity to do so38. 
In so far as the standard by which the actor's conduct is assessed is also a 
subjective one, it can be said that the negligent actor «could have done 
otherwise, given [her] capacities39 », and therefore she is morally and legally 
responsible for her actions40. Responsibility for negligently bringing about 
the conditions of one's own defence can also be explained on this basis. But 
how, from this point of view, could one explain the difference in blamewor-
thiness and, correspondingly, culpability, between negligent and intentional 
wrongdoing ? The assumption here is that a person who chooses to do a 
wrongful act is more to blame than one who simply fails to exercise her 
capacity to choose not to do it. But why is this so ? The choice theory, by 
abstracting choice, or the capacity to choose, from the agent's character, 
cannot offer a satisfactory answer to this question. By contrast, the charac-
ter theory, by viewing choice, or the failure to exercise a capacity to choose, 
as manifestations of character, provides a clearer basis for understanding 
why intentional wrongdoings entail a higher degree of blame than negligent 
ones41. 
As was said before, what precludes a person from exercising choice, 
and hence provides the grounds for an excuse, is either an incapacitating 
condition in that person or the lack of a fair opportunity to use a normal, i.e. 
non-defective, capacity. Thus, when we say that a person could not have 
done otherwise this might refer either to a defect in the person's inherent 
capacity of choosing, or to a situation in which the person is unable to use 
her normal choosing capacity effectively42. But how is the choosing agent to 
38. H.L.A. HART, op. cit., note 23, p. 136 ff. 
39. Id., pp. 152-157. 
40. Some have argued, however, that moral culpability presupposes some degree of aware-
ness of at least the risk of harm which one's conduct entails. In this respect the negligent 
actor cannot be held morally culpable, for her lack of awareness of the risk precludes 
her from choosing to engage in conduct that involves a risk of bringing about the 
prohibited harm. See G. WILLIAMS, Criminal Law: The General Part, 2nd ed., London, 
Stevens and Sons, 1961, pp. 122-123. 
41. As Arenella remarks, «By suppressing the link between character and choice, rational 
choice theorists offer an impoverished account of moral blame that does not accurately 
reflect the meaning of moral culpability embedded in our actual blaming practices » : 
P. ARENELLA, op. cit., note 7, p. 244. 
42. According to Blackstone, « there are three cases, in which the will does not join the act : 
1. Where there is a defect of understanding. For where there is no discernment, there is 
no choice ; and where there is no choice, there can be no act of the will, which is nothing 
else but a determination of one's choice, to do or abstain from a particular action : he 
therefore, that has no understanding, can have no will to guide his conduct. 2. Where 
there is understanding and will sufficient, residing in the party ; but not called forth and 
exerted at the time of the action done : which is the case of all offences committed by 
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be described here ? Is the choosing agent to be identified solely with the 
conscious will, the rational aspect of the choosing self, or should our 
description include emotional states, such as feelings, desires, aversions and 
the like ? Are these largely unconscious factors part of the choosing self or 
should they be viewed as potential obstacles to reasoned deliberation which 
the choosing self must endeavour to overcome ? It is submitted that the 
choosing agent should be described as including both, for emotions play a 
part in the choosing process as both products and causes of the judgements 
that determine our decisions43. Thus, when a person gets angry in the face 
of an act of injustice, such as the infliction of undeserved punishment, her 
anger need not be an obstacle to reasoned deliberation and choice. As 
Moore remarks, « internal factors, like emotions, cannot be said to incapaci-
tate our choices, except by an impermissibly narrow view either of who we 
are or of what our choosing agency consists44 ». But if the choosing agent is 
described so as to include all those attributes that make up a person's 
character, then there seems to be nothing to separate the present theory 
from the character theory of responsibility. 
Furthermore, it is recognised that some emotions, such as fear or anger, 
when they get out of hand, are capable of incapacitating choice, rendering 
the actor excusable. For emotions to have such an incapacitating effect on 
choice they must be «blind», i.e. not caused by judgements, and intense 
enough to cause action directly, that is without the mediation of rational 
judgement and choice. The rationale of the excuse in provocation and other 
partial defences is usually explained on this basis. But when the ability to 
choose is overcome by powerful emotions, how could the choice theorist 
explain the fact that the agent is still, to some degree, morally and legally to 
blame ? By shifting the emphasis from choice to capacity, die answer, again, 
seems to be that although the agent does not choose to do the wrongful act 
(killing), she had the capacity and a fair opportunity to have chosen not to 
do it—and this implies that the agent was capable of choosing to keep her 
chance or ignorance. 3. Where the action is constrained by some outward force and 
violence. Here the will counteracts the deed ; and in so far from concurring with, that it 
loathes and disagrees to what the man is obliged to perform [...] [The] several species 
of defect in will fall under one or other of these three general heads : [...] infancy, idiocy, 
lunacy, and intoxication, which fall under the first class ; misfortune and ignorance, 
which may be referred to the second ; and compulsion or necessity, which may properly 
rank in the third» : W. BLACKSTONE, op. cit., note 34, pp. 21-22. 
43. See J. SABINI and M. SILVER, « Emotions, Responsibility, and Character », in F. SCHOE-
MAN (ed), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions, Cambridge, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1987, pp. 164-175, at p. 168. 
44. M. MOORE, « Choice, Character and Excuse », (1990) 7 Social Philosophy and Policy 59, 
reprinted in M.L. CORRADO (ed), op. cit., note 7, p. 209. 
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emotions in check. But the choice theorist maintains that the agent's moral 
culpability in such cases does not rest on a prior assumption about those 
aspects of her character that precluded her from exercising her capacity to 
control her emotions. But by leaving outside the scope of the inquiry 
character—related considerations the choice theorist fails to account for 
what really justifies our actual blaming judgements in such cases. When we 
hold a person morally responsible for a wrongful act that was motivated by 
e.g. anger, it is because we blame her for not doing something about those 
aspects of her character that made it so difficult for her to control her anger 
and avoid engaging in morally and legally wrongful conduct. 
Hart maintains that the recognition of legal excuses, as connected with 
the requirement of fairness to the individual, reflects deeply-rooted moral 
distinctions that pervade social life. As he explains, 
Human society is a society of persons ; and persons do not view themselves or each 
other merely as so many bodies moving in ways which are sometimes harmful and 
have to be prevented or altered. Instead persons interpret each other's movements 
as manifestations of intentions and choices, and these subjective factors are often 
more important to their social relations than the movements by which they are 
manifested or their effects [...] This is how human nature in human society actually 
is and as yet we have no power to alter it45. 
It is a fact of life, that people respond in different ways to harm caused 
by others, depending on their judgments about whether the harm inflicted 
was deliberate, i.e. the result of a free choice, or accidental. In this respect 
it is important for the law to take into account and reflect those moral 
distinctions by reference to which the character of human relations in 
society is determined. According to Ronald Dworkin, Hart's successor in 
Oxford, this suggests that « the government should treat its citizens with the 
respect and dignity that adult members of the community claim from each 
other46». 
Hart defends legal excuses on the grounds that their presence within 
the legal system maximises individual liberty as it increases our powers of 
predicting and controlling law's interference with our lives. For if we were 
to be punished for harm we cause accidentally, or involuntarily, this would 
mean that we could no longer determine, by our free choices, whether or not 
the law will interfere with our lives. Even if it was true that our actions are 
causally pre-determined by factors which are beyond our control, as deter-
minists argue, this, Hart claims, would not remove the satisfaction which we 
experience from the exercise of choice, no matter what the intended conse-
quences of our choices may be47. In this respect, Hart's theory is, arguably, 
45. H.L.A. HART, op. cit., note 23, at pp. 182-183. 
46. R. DWORKIN, op. cit., note 13, (4th ed 1984), p. 11. 
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a version of rule-utilitarianism, for it views the system of excuses as a factor 
contributing to the maximisation of «the efficacy of the individual's in-
formed and considered choice48». The role of legal excuses is justified on 
the grounds that a system of excuses operates as a balancing factor between 
the maximisation of general welfare, as pertinent to crime prevention, on the 
one hand, and the maximisation of that other common good, individual 
liberty and freedom of choice, on the other. As Hart points out, however, 
there can be no comparison between the two social goods—crime preven-
tion and freedom of choice—in an all—inclusive calculation of the general 
good, for each occupies its own, distinct area or appropriate domain. It is 
from this point of view mat Hart argues that the principles pertaining to the 
maximisation of the good that is freedom of choice operate as a constraint 
on the maximisation of the other good, that is, the reduction of socially 
harmful conduct. 
Hart's interpretation of the role of excuses in law departs from the 
traditional utilitarian understanding of excuses, as expressed by Jeremy 
Bentham and other representatives of utilitarianism. Utilitarians view 
criminal punishment as a form of harm and, as such, as detracting from 
general welfare. From this point of view they argue that punishment should 
not be imposed for harmless or justified conduct or when it is ineffective, 
i.e. when its application contributes nothing to the prevention of socially 
harmful conduct. Furthermore, punishment should be avoided when it is 
unprofitable, i.e. when the harm which it entails is greater than the harm 
which is prevented by it, and when it is needless, i.e. when it is not the most 
economical way of preventing harmful conduct. From this viewpoint, utili-
tarians assert, punishing a person who has a valid excuse would be pointless 
for, among other things, it would have no good effect on the conduct of the 
excusable offender49. Hart, in criticising the traditional utilitarian approach 
to the role of legal excuses, argues that although the threat of punishment 
may be ineffective against the excusable offender, it does not follow that the 
punishment of excusable offenders would not have a general deterrent 
effect50. For that reason the role of legal excuses cannot be justified simply 
on the basis of a utilitarian balancing of costs and benefits. For Hart, as was 
pointed out before, the recognition of legal excuses as part of our legal 
system draws its justification from the (non-utilitarian) principle of fairness 
47. H.L.A. HART, op. cit., note 23, at p. 49. 
48. Id., at p. 46. 
49. J. BENTHAM, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, London, 
Burns and Hart (eds), (1970) (first published in 1789). 
50. H.L.A. HART, op. cit., note 23, pp. 19, 43, 48, 77. 
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to the individual citizen. It is only the general aim of punishment that is 
justified on utilitarian grounds51. 
Hart's theory of criminal responsibility, with its emphasis on the re-
quirement that the law should be applied so as to respect the choices of 
individual citizens, is built upon the modern liberal conception of a social 
order. Within this order law both sets constraints upon the pursuance of 
individual preferences and, at the same time, guarantees the individuals' 
freedom to express and, within limits, to implement their choices. In a liberal 
and individualist society compliance with the law is regarded as a means to 
achieving a balance between different and often conflicting individual 
choices. The effectiveness of individual choices is seen as depending upon 
the legal rules being observed52. In this respect, moral blame, as a basis of 
criminal responsibility and punishment, pertains to the violation of the law 
as a condition for securing social cooperation rather than to the doing of an 
immoral act as such. Indeed within the liberal order no particular moral 
standpoint can be given priority, for different moral standpoints are inter-
preted merely as expressions of individual preferences. This explains the 
shift in emphasis in Hart's theory from the concept of just deserts to that of 
fairness to the individual. As was said, at the centre of Hart's conception of 
fairness lies the idea that criminal punishment is morally unacceptable, 
unless the accused chose to subject herself to the risk of punishment by 
voluntarily breaking the law. It is the preponderance of liberal ideas in 
today's social and political life that seems to account for the importance and 
continuing influence of Hart's theory on criminal law doctrine 
The fairness/choice theory has been subjected to the criticism that it 
offers little practical guidance for criminal justice systems faced with a 
much less ideal world than the one Hart appears to presume. As one critic 
remarks, the fairness/choice theory is built upon a «gentlemen's club» 
51. From this point of view Hart argues against the introduction of a system of strict liability 
and the resulting elimination of legal excuses. According to him such a system will 
undermine fairness for it will result in the individual's being punished as a direct means 
to the promotion of social goals. He acknowledges, however, that with regard to certain 
types of offences, strict liability may be given priority over the requirement of fairness 
to the individual : id., especially Ch. 7. 
52. From the liberal's standpoint, the realisation of individual or social choices presupposes 
an ability to engage in a certain kind of practical reasoning. This reasoning consists, 
firstly, in the ordering of one's choices according to their significance, secondly, in the 
soundness of the methods by which choices are translated into decisions and actions 
and, thirdly, in the ability to act so as to maximise the satisfaction of those choices 
according to their ordering. The third condition reflects the central role of utilitarian 
principles in the liberal social and political theory. 
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understanding of justice53. As has been said, the theory rests on a concep-
tion of society in which people live together sharing the same values and 
being subject to rules of conduct that work to everyone's advantage. Within 
this framework, anyone who brakes the rules gains an unfair advantage over 
the other members of society and so she violates the reciprocal bonds that 
warrant the well-being of all society members, including the offender her-
self. Criminal punishment cancels out that advantage and, at the same time, 
reaffirms the values which the criminal justice system is designed to protect. 
Although this picture may be accurate enough with regard to certain types 
of offenders, especially some of those committing what is known as « white 
collar crimes54 », it appears too far off base when it comes to the large 
majority of criminals who come from the poorer classes of society. Al-
though even the least advantaged members of society may be said to enjoy 
some benefits from living under the law, e.g. a certain degree of personal 
protection, these do not usually regard themselves as sharing fairly in the 
benefits of social cooperation that are distributed under law's protection. 
From this point of view, therefore, the claim that each person in society is 
given a fair opportunity to choose between keeping the law or paying the 
penalty—the basis of Hart's theory of responsibility has been called into 
question. 
Furthermore, the choice theory, by placing the emphasis on the con-
cept of rational choice capacity as the sole basis of moral and legal blame 
misrepresents the meaning of moral responsibility as reflected in our actual 
moral judgements. Choice theorists focus on a person's ability to make 
rational choices about her actions—choices that are logically linked with 
the person's attaining certain identifiable objectives. Their concern is pri-
marily with the person's reasoning ability as a means to achieving certain 
ends, not with what shapes the person's desires that motivate her choice of 
action. This way of looking at the choosing agent has allowed choice 
theorists to treat the agent's ability for rational choice as a matter separate 
from those aspects of the agent's character, her desires, values, feelings, 
perceptions and goals, that are the source of her rational choices. In this 
respect they offer an unacceptably narrow description of the object of our 
moral judgements that leaves outside those important attributes of the 
moral character that give meaning to the agent's choices and provide the 
basis for holding people morally blameworthy (or praiseworthy) for their 
choices. When we blame someone for choosing to do a wrongful act, or for 
not exercising her capacity to choose to act according to the norm, it is 
53. See J.G. MURPHY, Retribution, Justice and Therapy, Dordrecht, D. Reidel Pub. Co., 
1979, p. 107. 
54. e.g. the corporate executive who commits fraud to avoid paying taxes. 
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because we hold her morally responsible for failing to do something about 
those aspects of her character that impair her ability to make the right moral 
choice in the circumstances. Similarly, when we excuse a person accused of 
a wrongful act, it is because we acknowledge that the wrongful conduct does 
not reflect a fault in that person's character as required for holding the 
person morally blameworthy. It is submitted that the character theory of 
responsibility, by drawing attention to what motivates our actual choices, 
provides a better basis for interpreting the moral significance of human 
actions and for explaining our actual blaming judgements with regard to 
those actions. On the other hand, if one places the emphasis on the neces-
sary connection between choosing agency and character, then the diffe-
rence between responsibility for choice and responsibility for character 
would tend to disappear. In so far as it is recognised that a bad choice is but 
an expression of a fault whether temporary or «permanent» in the 
actor's character, it shouldn't come as a surprise that the two theories 
overlap to a great extent in their treatment of legal excuses. 
Conclusion 
Criminal responsibility pertains to that aspect of criminal law that 
safeguards individuals from criminal punishment. Both theories examined 
in this paper proceed from the assumption that criminal responsibility is a 
defeasible concept: an accused cannot be held criminally liable if she 
successfully raises a legal excuse55. Much of the discussion about criminal 
responsibility revolves around the notion of involuntariness as a prere-
quisite for excusing in law and morals. The theories give different answers 
to the question of how involuntariness, as the basis of excusing, negates 
criminal liability-answers that reflect broader philosophical differences re-
garding the character and objectives of a criminal justice system. The two 
theories differ on the kinds of causes of action they each find to provide the 
55. One may contrast the two theories discussed in this paper with the so called « objective » 
theory of criminal responsibility. The « objective » theory does not regard voluntariness 
as a necessary condition of criminal liability. It holds, instead, that criminal liability 
should not be imposed if the accused has acted as a reasonable person with ordinary 
intelligence and reasonable prudence would have acted in the circumstances. The theory 
rejects the requirement of voluntariness as well as the individualisation of the criteria 
of criminal liability, on the basis that we cannot have a full picture of a person's capacities 
and limitations that may affect her ability to act according to the law in the circumstances 
(the problem of proof). The individualisation of the criteria of liability, it is argued, is 
incompatible with a system, such as the criminal law, whose aim is the utilitarian one 
of inducing people's external conformity to the rules. See O. HOLMES, The Common 
Law, Lecture II (1881), 42,43, 87. For a critical approach to this theory see H.L.A. HART, 
op. cit., note 23, pp. 242-244 ; G. FLETCHER, op. cit., note 8, p. 504 ff. 
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basis for holding people responsible. The character theory focuses on cha-
racter, the choice theory on choice and the capacity to choose. According 
to the character theory, excuses preclude the attribution of moral and legal 
blame by denying that a wrongful act reflects a flaw in the actor's character. 
For the character theorist, moral blame is a necessary condition of criminal 
liability and punishment. The choice theorist's position is that excusing 
conditions preclude criminal liability because, when these conditions are 
present, the actor does not have the capacity or a fair opportunity to make 
a choice to act as the relevant legal norm requires. By contrast with the 
character theory, the choice theory treats moral culpability requirements 
only as a useful side-constraint on the pursuance of general deterrence as 
the chief aim of criminal liability and punishment. Although both theoretical 
approaches have exerted, and continue to exert, an important influence on 
the development of criminal law doctrine in Anglo-American jurisdictions, 
none seems capable of offering generally acceptable or conclusive answers 
to all the questions that may arise. This means that when it comes to dealing 
with important doctrinal issues or to deciding on matters of criminal policy, 
elements of both theories enter the discussion. It is submitted that the 
character theory, with its emphasis on moral blameworthiness, provides a 
better basis for understanding the attribution of criminal responsibility and 
the role of legal excuses in relation to criminal offences which also consti-
tute moral wrongs (mala in se). The choice theory, on the other hand, may 
be given priority when considering the question of criminal responsibility in 
relation to criminal offences in which the element of moral stigma is absent 
or minimal (malaprohibita), or whose moral basis remains in question. 
